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The Economic Link-up of Guangdong and Hong Kong:
Structural and Developmental Problems
Tsang Shu-ki and Cheng Yuk-shing
1.

Introduction

The phenomenal link-up between the Hong Kong and Gu angdong economies has been
proceeding at a remarkable speed since the launching ofthe Chinese economic reform in late 1978.
The process has largely been market-driven and seems to suit the short-run comparative aqyantage
on both sides. In essence,. however, it has been a result of a reallocation of resources across the
border, made possible by China's open policy. It has not yet led to a benign form of developmental
upgrading which embodies the strengthening of the long-tenn foundation for productivity and
competitiveness enhancement. lndeed, the tremendous "windfall profits" obtained so far could be
regarded as a disincentive for R & D investments as well as beneficial decisions that may incur
painful side e直認ts in the short run.
Problems which are structural and developmental in nature, including bias and duplication
in production pattems, inflationary pressure, widening income inequality, and the loss of
competitiveness, have emerged in both Hong Kong and Guangdong. These problems could be
traced to the lack of countervailjng forces that promote far-sighted strategies, vis-a-vis "shorttermism" driven by market supplies and demands and yearly profit maximization.
In this paper, we argue that while better coordination should be pursued to ensure mutually
beneficial developments and to avoid duplication in efforts and undesirable convergence in
industrial structur郎， the future trajectories of the two economies will not and cannot be identical
Hong Kong and Guangdong are different in size and endowments, and face dissi~lar political and
economic frameworks. Independent policies and measures to nurture specific advantages and to
solve intemal problems have to be made. lndeed , a certain distancing in economic relations
between the two economies will be healthy.

11.

China's open policy and structural change in Hong Kong

A decade or so after 1978 , the Pearl River Delta of the Guangdong province became 組
important hinterland of Hong Kong's manufacturing industries. This form of economic linkage
between the two places has totally altered the development path of Hong Kong. ln the 1960s and
the 1970s, Hong Kong experienced a process of rapid export-led industrialization. A large labourintensive manufacturing sector was established. ln the second half of the 1970s, however, Hong
Kong was troubled by the problems of rising costs, external market constraints, and the pressure of
technological upgrading. The Hong Kong government, which had been proud of its commitment
to economic laissie faire , realized that something had to be done. The Committee on lndustrial
Diversification was set up in 1977 with an objective to study what strategies Hong Kong should
adopt to tackle the escalating problems.
Two years later, in 1979, the Committee suhmitted a report to the Hong Kong government.
The timing was indeed ironica1. As soon as China opened its door in the same year, the whole
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thinking about climbing the technological ladder and diversi月ring products and markets was derailed. Literally un1imited supply of labour, asking wages at less than 10% of the on-going rates in
Hong Kong, became available in southem China. Similar bargains existed in land , energy and other
charges. Even without technological upgrading and industrial diversification, this new-found
advantage was su伍cient to propel the Hong Kong economy forwards for many years to come.
In retrospect, if China had not implemented the “ open doo r" policy, Hong Kong might
have been forced to go along the tr句 ectory of technological upgrading of the other three “ Asian
Tigers" (Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea). lnstead, what has happened is a massive relocation
of manufacturing industries to the Pear1 Ri ver Delta and a further expansion of the labour-intensive
industries. Up to now, 3 to 5 million workers in Guangdong are reportedly working directly or
indirectly for Hong Kong, compared with the total work force of about 3 million in the territory
itself

The immediate implication of this "transformation" is the release of a great deal of
manpower to other sectors. On the other hand歹 export processing of Gu angdong has boosted the
demand for Hong Kong' s transport and trading services. Since the development of transport and
other services of China has been lagging behind the rapid expansion of trading actívities, China' s
reliance on Hong Kong to provide re-export and financial services has grown.
The industrial restructuring , or de-ind俯身的liz，α tion， of Hong Kong has proceeded with full
force. In 1980, manufacturing accounted for 23 .7% of GDP in 1980, while the service sectors
took up 67.5%. ln 1995 , the former's share fell to 8.80/0 as the latter's rose to 83.8 0/0 (see Table 1)
ln terrns of employment, Table 2 shows the dramatic changes. ln 1980, the manufacturing sector
employed over 900,000 persons. The number had fallen below 400,000 by 1995. That the
manufacturing workforce of an economy could be halved within the horizon of a decade must be
one ofthe records in wo r1 d economic history.
To critics, however, it also reveals that employment ín the territory has largely been nonsector-specific in nature. It reflects rather poo r1y on the skill level that has been required in the
major sectors. To put it dramatically, anyone here can be a textile worker in one month, a salesman
in another, and a property agent in yet another. Trus does not au伊r well for the long-run prospect
of productivity enhancement, wruch requires specialization, professionalization, and accumulation
of expertise in specific areas. It adds weight to the skeptical view that the Hong Kong economy is
still ravelling in the bonanza of the China factor for cost reduction and "re-rating" by intemational
investors and speculators. No serious efforts in industrial and technological upgrading have been
petfonned
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Table 1 Production-based GDP at current prices by economic activity
(unit: 010)
1980

1985

1990

1995

0.8

0.5

0 .3

0.1

0.2

0.1

#

#

23 .7

22.1

17. 6

8.8

Electricity, gas and water

1. 3

2.6

2 .3

2.3

Construction

6.6

5.0

5 .4

4.9

Wholesa1e/retail , importJexport
trades, restaurants and hotels

21 .4

22.8

25 .2

27 .4

Transport , storage and
commurucat1 ons

7 .4

8.1

9.5

9.8

Financing, insurance, real
estate & business services

23 .0

16.0

20.2

24.9

personal services

] 2.]

16.7

14.5

17.1

Ownership of premises

8.9

10.5

10.6

12.7

-5 .4

-4.6

咀5 . 5

-8.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Agriculture and tìshing

Mi ning and

quanγlng

Manufacturing

Community型 social

and

A句 ustment

for tìnancial
intennediation services
indirectly measured

Source:

Hong Kong Govemlnent, Estimates 0/ Gross Domestic Product 1961-1996,
Table 11

Note:

# - insignificant share.
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Table 2 Employment by

IndustηGroup

(p ersons engaged)

1985

1990

December
1995

902, 521
(46.5)

859,648
(39.6)

741 ,366
(30.1)

375 ,766
(14.9)

Wh olesale/retail , import! export
trades, restaurants and
hotels
441 ,892
(22.8)

588 ,040
(27.1)

805 ,411
(32.7)

74, 109
(3.8)

94,560
(4 .4)

129.551
(5 .3)

172, 174
(6.9)

123 ,883
(6 .4)

177,346
(8.2)

270 ,610
(11. 0)

378 ,244
(15 .1)

396,7 67
(20.5)

453 ,330
(20.9)

517 , 107
(2 1. 0)

564,314
(22.5)

1980

扎1anufacturing

Transport, storage and
commurucatlons

Financing, insurance, real
estate and business services

Other industrial sectors

Sources:

Quarter~v Report

1,018 , 198
(40.6)

01 Employment, Vacancies and p，句;roll Statistics, various

lssues
Note:

血

Figures in parenthesis represent percentage shares of the total

The

strengthening of the Hong Kong-Guangdong linkage

In the opening up of China, it is natural that Hong Kong rapidly increased her linkage with
the Guangdong economy, given the latter's geographical and sub-cultural proxinlÍty. Table 3 shows
the relevant trade figures
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Table 3 Imports and Exports of Hong Kong and Guangdong
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(9) Share of Hong Kong imports from China
(I O) Total Exports ofHong Kon日
( 11) (5 )1(1 0)
(12、 Share of HonQ KonQ exoorts to China
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(2 )1(7)

.

(8)
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EA'
唔，

Total Imports of Hong

fBEl-J'I
行

(5 )1(4)

I

(6)

(7)

98/

Total imports of Guangdong
Imports ofGuangdong from Hong Kong

1724958867512
43832762351

均

(4)
(5)

.
.

(Unit: US$ 100 million)

8/

(2)1(1)

泣。

(3)

寸

Total exoorts of GuanQdonQ
Exports of Guangdong to Hong Kong

II110011

(1)
(2)
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巳
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Source :Guangdong Stαtistical Yearbook, 1994, 1995; Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics,
vanous lssues

As can be seen from the table, China's shares in Hong Kong's imports and exports
amounted to about one-third in 1992-94. Guangdong 、 s shares, ranging between 7% and onefourth, increased very fast during those years. Al so , the figures indicate that as much as 70%-85%
of Guangdong' s imports and exports were transacted directly or indirectly through Hong Kong
Apart from trading, investment across the border 企om either side also expanded
tremendously. Hong Kong has been China's largest “ outside" investor, contributing over 60% of
the inf1 0w ofinvestment capital. At the end of 1993 , a total of 167,500 foreign-invested enterprises
(F llis) were set up in China. Am ong them, 106,914 or 63 .8% were 企om Hong Kong. Ranked in
terms of the total number of foreign-invested enterprises attracted, the best-performing ten
provmces in China were, from top down: Gu angdong, Jiangsu , Shandong, Fuji妞， ZhRjiangp
Shanghai, Hainan, Liaoning, Beijing, and Tia吋 in. The number of foreign-invested enterprises in
Guangdong amounted to 44 ,705 , which represented 26 .7% ofthe national total. 1 During 1990-94,
the pledged and the actual amounts of utilization of foreign capital of Gu angdong totalled US$
90.12 billion and US$ 30.57 billion respectively. Of the amounts, Hong Kong constituted US$
71 .42 billion (79 .20/0) US$ 22 .4 1 billion (73 .3%) respectively
On the other hand, mainland China' s investment in Hong Kong has also been increasing at
an impressive rate. As Table 4 shows, by 1994, China's cumulative stock of direct investments in
Hong Kong accounted for about 18% of total foreign direct investments in manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors and ranked third in value after the UK and Japan, followed by the US. The
inf10w of capital 企om Guangdong has been very important. In October 1994, the total market value
of the shares of Guangdong Enterprises (Holdings) Limited , which was listed in Hong Kong's
1Jingji

yangjiu cαnkao (E conomic Research Reference Material) , Beijing, China, 120ctober.1994

". l
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stock market, amounted to HK$ 8.81 6 billion (US$ 1. 141 billion). On 30 November 1994, it
became one of the component shares of the Hang Seng Index, reflecting its rising status.

Table 4 N et Assets Attributable to Inward Direct Investments
in Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Sectors in 1994
Value (HK$bn)
M句 or

lnvestor country

Manufacturing Non-manufacturing
2.97
14.74
4.23
11. 80
10.23
43 .97

UK
Japan
China
US
Others
Total

Sources:

203 .1
136 .4
129.8
75.9
14 1. 1
686 .3

Total
206 .07
15 1. 14
134.03
87.70
15 1. 33
730.27

0/0 share

28.2
20.7
18 .4
12.0
20.7
100.0

Industry Department, Hong Kong Government, 1994 Survey of External
Investments in Hong Kong; Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong
Government , Externallnvestments in Hong Kong's Non-lnanufacturing
Sectors.

The rapid strengthening ofthe China-Hong Kong or Guangdong-Hong Kong
economic ties has profound impact on Hong Kong. According to the estimation of the
Economic Research Department of Hang Seng Bank, the contribution of the "China factor" to
Hong Kong' s GDP rose from 5.3% in 1980 to 25 .70/0 in 1990. 2 Given the trend ofincreasing
linkage in recent years , the share probably has risen to over 30%.

IV.

Emerging problems in Hong Kong

With the big push of the "China factor" , Hong Kong has sustained a respectable
growth rate and experienced drastic changes in its economic structure. However , some
problems are noteworthy. First, the growth rate has still been dec1ining. In the 1970s, average
annual growth in real terms ofHong Kong's GDP was as high as 9.2%. In the 1980s, it was
7.5%. During 1990-95 , it slipped to only 5.5%. One explanation ofthe declining growth rate
often invoked is the slowing down of the growth of the labour force. The average annual
growth of the locallabour force in the 1970s and the 1980s was 4.2% and 1. 7% respectively.
During 1990-95 , however , it actual1y revived to a yearly rate of 2.2% , as local demographic
factors , returned migrants and increased in-takes from China generated r e1 ativ e1y more labour
supply.
2 Hang

Seng Bank, Hong Kong, Hang Seng Economìc λ1onthly， June 1993 .
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If we scrutinise the issue more carefully , we can observe some wonying trends. The
annual growth of per capita GDP in Hong Kong during ] 980-89 averaged 5.5%. It fell to
3.8% in 1990-95. Ifwe further examine the statistics ofGDP per worker , we find that the
respective growth rates in the two periods were 5.7% and 3 .3 %. These figures suggest that ,
prima facie , there have been some problerns with Hong Kong' s productivity. The Hong Kong
economy should not have become “ mature" so quickly

I

The availability of cheap labour from Guangdong has no d9~bJ .helpedwfI.9.!lg Kong's
manufacturing industries to lower production costs. It has also , ir羽K~~lly，Jl alì訊設ed the
pressure for Hong 足9ng to upgrade technology and to improve productivity. As a sudden
'~/widening of the hirìi釘land leads to a drastic reduction of labour and related costs, the
incentives to invest in R&D and to adopt advanced techniques can hardly become visible . This
is particularly true when short-term protìts are huge and the authorities are not taking any proactive measures to induce long-term optimality. '.幻守主叭
1n a way , the Chinese reform has rendered Hong Kong' s consideratÏon to upgrade its
industry suþ é的uous. To Hong K.ong, it is similar to an unexpected discoverγofa new gold
mine or an oil field . How to make use ofthe “ windfall profit" of such a discovery is crucia1. If
the “ windfal1 profit" , for instance , is not used for reinvestment in productive activities that can
raise Hong Kong' s long-term advantage , but instead channelled into the pursuit of further
short-term profits , asset inflation and consumer inflation wi I1 then accelerate. As a result ,
operation costs in Hong Kong will be pushed up. The sectors that cannot generate “ windfall
profit" in the short run (e.g. high-tech industries in their formation stages) will encounter
heavy pressure and eventually be crowded ou t. The economy will inevitably suffer from the
phenomena of “ ho J1 owing out" or the “ Dutch Disease" .3
Whether “ hollowing out" or the “ Dutch Disease" will occur or has already emerged in
Hong Kong is debatable. 1n any case , there are some noteworthy trends. First, it appears that
Hong Kong manufacturers have not used the huge profits that have been earned in Pearl River
Delta for investment in technological upgrading. The profits are either used for “ extensive
expansion" , that is , building more factories of the same (or even somewhat lower)
technological level in cheaper localities in southern China, or repatriated to Hong Kong for
investment in non-manufacturing or even non-productive , speculative , activities
Conventíonal \visdom has it that the Hong Kong economy has undergone a “ structural
traosformation" towards higher status: narrlely from a manufacture-based to a service-based
economy , presumably with larger value-added. Such a characterization is in our view
misleading. 1n the textbook case of development economics , such a transformation is a result
oftechnoiogical eohancement and a rise in productivity. 1n the process , hun1an as well as
other resources in the traditional sector are released and allocated to the growing sector. The
developmeot of the latter in turn 丘lrther facilitates the productivity growth of the traditional
3Por a survey 00 the literature of the "Dutch disease" , see W.M. Corden, "Booming Sector and
Dutch Disease Economics, Survey and Consolidation" , Oxford Econom;c Papers, Vo l. 36, 1984,
pp.359-380.
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sector. A virtuous circle wi l1 thus be formed , with falling employment in the traditional sector
and rising employment in the leading sector
The so-called structural transformation of the Hong Kong economy is quite different
from this kind ofupgradiog. What has happened is more a change in the regional division of
labour and some of its derived consequences. Originally , the mobility of resources
(particularly labour and capital) between China and Hong Kong was very low. Once China
adopted the open-.door policy , most of the barriers to resource flows were lifted . The new
mode of division of labour, often called qian diαn hou chαng (the shop at the front , the factory
at the back) , thus emerged. Obviously, Hong Kong is the diαn (shop) , and southern China is
the chang (factory). Since production costs differ a lot across the border, a large amount of
benefits can be reaped from the simple relocation of industries by both sides. This simply
reflects the operation ofthe law of static comparative advantage. 4
The side-effect is however a significant reduction in the pressure 00 technological
upgrading. The technological sophistication ofHong Kong' s manufacturing industries
(including their off-springs in the Pearl Ri ver Delta) has been lagging behind their competitors
in South Korea , Taiwan , and Singapore. What Hong Kong is still relying on is low production
costs in its hinterland
Moreover , I-I ong Kong has been faced with the problem of “ relatively low growth and
relatively high inflation" in recent years. Real economic growth has been about 50/0 , but the
consumer inflation rate has been double-digit or close to double-digit for quite some time. As
for asset inflation , the situation has been worse. During 1991-93 , the prices of residential
property rose more than one time. It did not fall until the government introduced a series of
measures to cool down the market in early 1994. 1n any case, the prices and the rental rates of
real estates in Hong Kong are among the highest in the world. Certainly, with the upward
trend in China' s economic power and international status, Hong Kong as a stepping stone is
stiU an attractive site to inves t. Even Chinese capital has been flowing into Hong Kong in
huge amounts. AJl these phenomena have contributed to I-I ong Kong' s high in f1 ation; and the
ways that Hong Kong businessmen have utilized their “windfall profit" have also added to the
price pressure. The rising price level then serves to push up production costs and crowd out
unprofitable industries in the short term. Even the profits of the service sector have been
eroded. Some of the services have been moving northwards or outwards
Third , Hong Kong has witnessed a worsening distribution of incomes. Table 5 shows
some relevant figures .

4可
For an earlier 仰
ana叫ly戶S1βs of the lack of long-term productivity en凶
1吐h由組C臼en1en
叫
1t in the so called
"冶S泣tructωura
叫1 transf必
01口
m
官na
剖t仙i昀
Oαn" in the Hong Kong economy, see Tsang Shu-ki , "Inflation" , ηle Other
Hong Kong Report 1992, The Chinese University Press, pp .4 25-445 .
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Table 5 Changes in household income distribution in Hong Kong
In ω 且 e

Jncome {!fOUn

sbare

(溢〉

19.2l

l.976

19.&J

1.9.&.6

19S1.l

lqq 的

Lowest auintile
2nd quintile
3rd quintile
4th quintile
Highest quintile
Total

6.2
10.2
14.3
20 .0
49.3
100.0

5 .4
10.1
14.9
20 .1
49.5
100.0

4.6
9.8
14.3
20 .9
50 .4
100.0

5.0
9.8
14.0
20.5
50.7
100.0

4 .3
9.0
13.5
20 .4
52.8
100.0

3.7
8.2
12.7
19.1
56.3
100.0

(3lllL.C..O己所cie.nt

Ü..A.3

Ü..A.3

QASJ

Q 坐5.3

Q.A16

。有 lR

Seen from changes in the quintile distribution of income and the Gini coefficient, there
ha's been a secular trend of increasing inequality. The situation worsened notably during 198696. Indeed , Hong Kong' s distribution of income is the most unequal among the
5
countries/areas of similar development levels. The reasons are manifold. First, as the income
distribution in the service sector is more dispersed , an increase in Hong Kong' s inequality is in
a way "iüitural" in its move towards a “ service economy". On the other hand , although the
economic ties between Hong Kong and China have benefitted both sides, the distribution of
the benefits among recipients is highly uneven. The major beneficiaries have been the Hong
Ko i1g enterprises which have invested in China, followed by local authorities , enterprises and
workers in Guangdong. As to employees in Hong Kong who work in sectors that do not have
c1 0se ties to China, they have not benefitted much from the process of economic link-up.
Moreover , many in the atfected sectors (e.g. mid-aged skilled manufacturing workers who
have been replaced by their much cheaper counterparts further north) have been disadvantaged
and have suffered from a fall in real incomes, or outright unemployment

v.

Economic development and resource f1 0w in Guangdong

Guangdong' s economic performance since the launch of the open policy has been very
impressive. During 1979-93 , Guangdong's GDP registered an annual average growth of
13.9% in real terms , much higher than the national average of 9.3 %. Apart from the efforts of
Guangdong itsel f, the central policy of letting Guangdong "go one step ahead of other
provinces" as well as the geographical proximity factor (l ying along the coast and
neighbouring Hong Kong) have also helped.
Similar to the case of Hong Kong , China' s open policy has facilitated resource mobility
and regional division of labour between Guangdong and other places in the country. The on]y
ditference is that while Hong Kong has moved factories to Guangdong to make use of its
cheap labour( Guangdo時 has instead absorbed a la眼 amount of labou的s from other
5 See Tsang Shu剖， "Income Distribution" ， 刃le Other Hong Kong R只port 1993, The Chinese
University Press, pp.361-368.
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provinces. 1n the early 1990s, according to estimates, the labourers coming from other
provinces to work in Dongguan and Baoan totalled 1.4 million. 6 Some other reports say that
there are already over 10 million "outside" workers in Guangdong , although more official
sources put the figure at 7-8 million. Thus , Hong Kong has exported factories , capital,
technologies and outside connections to Guangdong. At the same time , Guangdong has
imported labourers from other provinces, many ofwhich are working in Hong Kong-invested
plants. )
As far as labour is concerned , Hong Kong is more reliant on Guangdong than
Guangdong is on other provinces. A popular estimation of labourers working in Hong Konginvested factories in Guangdong is about 3 million , which is already larger than the totallabour
force in Hong Kong. From another angle , total employed labour in Guangdong amounted to
34.3391 million in 1993. 7 1fthe report of 10 million “ outside" workers in Guangdong is
accurate , the share of “ outside" worker in total employment is significant , but not to the extent
ofHong Kong's external reliance.

均h
y
尸
J-

A、

F

f、 Besides， taking "first mover" advantage and making use of its special status,
Guangdong has absorbed quite a significant amount of capital and investment from other
provinces, which has contributed to its economic growth) One key piece of evidence is the
change in the deposit-loan gap in Guangdong's banking system. At the end of 1985 , bank
loans exceeded deposits by Rmb 19 .4 82 billion, equivalent to 64 .1% oftotal deposits . 1n end1990, the gap fell to Rmb 12.602 billion, or 11.0% oftotal deposits. More notably ,
outstanding loans became less than deposits in Guangdong' s banking system since April 1991
onwards. For the whole financial system in Guangdong (including all non-bank :tìnancial
institutions) as a whole, total loans have been less than total deposits since June 1991. At the
end of 1992 , deposits in the banking system exceeded loans by Rmb 56.304 billion, the gap
representing 23.7% of total deposits. This change reflects not only the increase in the
available capital in Guangdong itsel f, but also the inflow of capital from other provinces.

Nevertheless, the supply of outside capital to Guangdong does not seem to have been
very stable. Aft er China had adopted the macro-control measures in mid 1993 , large amounts
ofthe “ hot money" in real estates , stock and futures markets were withdrawn. Tens ofbillions
yuan were repatriated back to their home provinces. The financial situation of Guangdong
deteriorated dramatically. Deposits declined sharply, giving rise to some liquidity problems.
At the end of 1993 , the positive deposit-loan gap in Guangdong's banking system fell to Rmb
24.839 billion, which was only 10.00/0 oftotal deposits (compared with 23 .7% a year ago)
The situation did not stabilize until the second qua此er of 1994.
On the whole , the rapid economic development of Guangdong after 1979 has been a
result of a large increase in factor mobility. A huge amount of short-term profits has been

Ming, "Yaoyou quanxin di silu, zhengce he tizhi" (Completely New Thinking, Policy and
System are needed) , Gang-Al所ngji (Hongkong-Macau Economics), N 0.7 , 1992, pp. 17-18

6Yang

7 Guangdong

Tongji Nianjian 1994 (Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1994)
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generated by this kind of factor mobility. IIow to consolidate the development and to derive
reliable long-term advantage will be a big challenge to Guangdong in the future

VI.

Characteristics and problems of Guangdong's economic structure

Similar to Hong Kong , the impressive economic growth record in Guangdong has
arisen frorn a regional relocation of resources , more than genuine technological upgrading.
Short-term benefits , therefore , coexist with potential long-term difficu 1ties. The problems ,
moreover , are largely structural in nature
First , on the whole , the externallinkage of Guangdong is much stronger than its
internallìnkage. In other words , the industrial sectors inside Guangdong have rather weak
inter-connections among themselves. There has been little coordination of production
amongst varjous sectors inside the province. Production in various sectors in fact is
predominantly dictated by the external market. On the basis of the input-output table of
Guangdong in 1987, it has heen estimated that the multipliers ofthe industries (the increase in
the output of the whole economy resulting from one dollar's in Ç.rease in the output of a
particular industry) in Guangdong only ranged from 2.3 to 3. 2(, which implies a rather loose
岫ge b伽een the in側的 、

\

Second , there has been a convergence in the output structure of various production
centres in Guangdong. ( The implication is that cities and tovvnships in the province are
increasingly engaged in similar production activities (in particular labour-intensive expo 此
processing) , with li忱 divlsion 0仙。叭nd co叫削 叫 T枷 6 1ists 伽 resu1ts of a
comparative study of the functional structures of cities in some major provinces in China
conducted by Dai Hez凶 ， a geographer from Shandong. Eleven economic functíons , measured
in terms of per capita output vaJues of specific sectors , are examined. A city is said to be
specialìzing in one function if its per capita output value of that function is higher than the
provincial average. If a city is found to be specializing in more than one functions , the
function with the highest above-average output value will be chosen. Moreover, the
desìgnated specialized function must rank in absolute output terms among the top four in the
city. If a city does not have any specialized function , it is then classified as a “ general city"

Jianhua, "Zhujiang sal!jiaozhou jingji fazhen I的igui yu qia呼叫1" (Review and Prospects of
the Economic Development of the Pearl River Delta) , in Zhongshan University (ed.), "Zhujiang
sa旬的ozhou jingji 戶zhen huigui 川 qza旬的月" (Review and Prospects of the Economic
Development of the Pearl River De1t成 Zhongshan Universíty Publishing House, 1992, pp. 22-37
8Z hou

/'
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Table 6 A comparison of the economic functions of cities in major provinces in China
Shandong
N
P

Liaoning
N
P

Jiangsu
N
P

b也ning

2

3

15.0

2

Electricity

2

5.0

2

Economic fu11ctions

5.9

~h~iagg

N

7.7

Hebei

Guangdong
N
P

N

P

3

5.3

4

15 .4

2

5.3

P

N

4.0

4.0

P

Henan

Sichuan
P
N

3.8

2

8.7

2

8.7

。

Metal1 urgy

T
I

2.9

Petro-chemica1

2

lC叫ct…terial

。

。。

Machinery aIld electronics

4

1 1. 8

Textiles

4

1 1. 8

Paper-mak: ing

Foods

2

10.0

4

20.0

Transport , pos旭geand
telecommunications

2.9

Commerce and catering

。

。。

General cities

15

44.1

2

8.0

2

7.7

2

8.0

2

2

5.0

2

10.0

3

5.0

。

8.7

0.0

3

5.3

1 1. 5

4.3

3.8

2

8.7

4.3

5.3

2

7.7

3

13.0

3

12 .0

4.3

5.3

2

7.7

5

2 1. 7

4

16.0

2

8.7

10.5

3

11. 5

2

8.7

0.0

O

。。

。

。。

5.3

I

3.8

2

10.5

4

15 .4

4

17 .4

。

0.0

O

0.0

。

0.0

I 7.7

。

。。

3.8

2

8.0

2

。

0.0

3.8

。

。。

。

。。

4

。

4.0

3

2.9

2

2

3.8

5.0

。

0.0

。

0.0

。

。。

20.0

7

26.9

9

36.0

8

34.8

2

42.1

4 .3

3.8

5.3

8

4.3

4

15 .4

。

'-----

Notes:
N represents the number of cities and P the percentage share ín the total number of cities
Source: Dai He泣止 “A study of the s仕ucture of the city system ín Shandong ," Jingji dili (Econornic Geography) , Vol. l4 , No.2 , 1994 , p . 29 . 甘le results are
computed with figures published ín Zhongguo chengshi tongji nianjian 1991 (China Statistical Yearbook of Cities 1991)

。。
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As shown in Table 6, among the 19 cities in Guangdong , eight or 42.1 % are “ general
cities" . The share is the second highest among the eight provinces under examination. It 臼
iS
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S
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Another simple indicator 出
t ha
前t can show the convergence in the output structure of various
Gu angdong cities is the index of 昀
r eg
♂lona
叫1 divergence used by Paul Krugma
組
n， which is defined as:

I ilsi -s*1
where SI is the share of industry i in the total manufacturing output of a city and SI* is the share of
industry i in the total manufacturing output of the whole Guangdong province.9 The index ranges
企om 0 to 2 and a higher value indicates a bigger difference between the average (p rovincial) output
structure and that of the the city under investigation. If, on average, the manufacturing struc仙re of
the cities has become c1 0ser to the average (provincial) structure, we can say that( there is a
convergence in the structure.) Here we utilise the data of 40 manufacturing industìies in 18
Guangdong cities (p refectures) to determine whether there had been a convergence or a divergence
10
of the lnanufacturing structure between 1988 and 1994.
As shown in Table 7, out of the 18
cities, nine registered a decrease in the index of regional divergence. The average of the index for
the 18 cities decreased 企om 0.713 to 0.663 , implying an increase in the convergence ofthe output
structure
The problem of the convergence in the output structure probably has not been fully
reflected in the above index , as it is based on aggregate data of forty industries. An ecdotal reports
show that the duplication of the investments in some specific industrial products has been very
serious in the Pèar1 River Delta. F or instance, most cities have their own production factories for
air-conditioners and there are a total of 30 such factories in the Pear River De1ta. On the other
hand, there are 250 cement factories in the De1ta, 860/0 of which have small production capacity of
less than 200,000 tons. As for the automobile industry, as many as 97 enterprises had been
established by the end of 1993. ( There has been litt1 e coordination among the cities in the
development of 伽叫1dustm 11 7

9 See Paul Kru gman, Geography and Trade , The I\位T Press 1991 , pp.75-76. Note that Paul
Kru gman uses share of employment while we use share of output in computing the index

10 The data are available in the Guangdong tongji n均可ian (Guangdon Statistical Yearbook) , 1989
and 1995
Zhang Nan, "'Zhu San Jiao' gongye chanye jiegou qutong de xianxiang yu duice (The current
situation o f' the convergence of the industrial structure in Pearl River De1ta and policy
prescriptions)" , Zhujiang sa旬的ozhou jingji (Pear1 River Delta Economy), NO.1 之 1996， pp.47-48
11
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Table 7 In dex of regionaI divergence

1 Gu angzhou
2 Shenzhen
3 Zhuhai
4 Shantou
5 Shaoguan
6 Heyuan
7 Meizhou
8 Huizhou
9 Shanwei
10 Dongguan
11 Zhongshan
12 Jiangmen
13 Foshan
14 Yangjiang
15 Zhanjiang
16 孔1aoming

17 Zhaoqing
18 Qingyuan
Av立盤空

1988
0.391
0.751
0.686
0.522
0.923
1.000
0.702
0.670
0.978
0.580
0.540
0 .435
0.505
0.878
0.662
1. 152
0.542
0.908
0.713

1994
0 .3 85
0.754
0 .4 84
0.613
1.007
0.751
0.765
0.700
0.695
0.546
0 .448
0 .469
0.587
0.806
0.731
0.949
0.522
0.714
0.663

The weak internal linkage and the low level of specialization in Guangdong are not
This kind of phenomena may merely 叫e叫le openness of Guangdong
With a strong outward linkage, Guangdong needs not worry much about the intema1 division of
labour. By responding prompt1y to extemal market signa1 s, huge profits can already be earned.
The operational mode of "the shop at the 丘。此， the factory at the back" in the Hong KongGu angdong linkage has been a major factor leading to this structure of “ strong external linkage,
weak intemallinkage, and low specialisation". Moreover, in the process of export-oriented labourintensive industrialisation, Gu angdong's competitiveness has largely been based on low production
costs and preferential policies from the cent叫 government. Within a certain period of time,
coordination of internal production was therefore not relevant.

f necmdyab仙恤g .

Yet , there are doubts whether this kind of extemal linkage can be relied on as the only
momentum of growth for very long. The pertinent questions are: should the mode of extemal
linkage (the shop at the 企01前， the factory at the back) be upgraded? If yes , in this process of
upgrading, should internal linkage and coordination of production within Guangdong be
strengthened? Should regional division of labour and cooperation be promoted and improved?
The last question brings us to the third structural characteristic of Guangdong' s economic
development: regional imbalances. 1n 1978 , the gross 叫ue of industrial and agricultural output of
the Pearl River De1ta constituted 32.7% ofthe provincial tot址 The share rose to 57.6% in 1990
and 68.7% in 1994. 1n contrast, the share of the mountainous areas, which constitutes 60% of total
land area and 40% of total population, fell 企om 16% to 13 .4% during 1978-1990. Interestingly,
the share increased to 15.6% in 1994. Wh ether this was the resu1t of a shift in government policy

15
to a1l eviate inequality has to be scnltinised. The per capita figures , on the other hand, show an
unambiguously rising inequality. Per capita GDP ofthe Pearl River De1ta was Rmb 1106 .4 higher
than that ofthe mountainous areas in 1985. The gap widened to Rmb 228 1. 5 in 1990 and further
to Rmb 12500 in 1994. During the same period, the difference between the average per capita
savings deposits rose 仕om Rmb 548 to Rmb 2254 and then to Rmb 3135 One apparent cause of
the imbalances has been the uneven allocation of resources. According to the figures of the
regionallending of the five major ba叫(s and the rural credit cooperatives in Gu angdong provided
by Han Houyuan , the share of loans provided to the Pearl River Delta increased from 57.94% in
1978 to 68.670/0 in 1989, while the share for the mountainous areas declined 企om 14 .2 7% to
‘

12.52010.
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engine of growth, those areas that have poor endowments and
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VII.

Future deveJopment strategies of Hong Kong and Guangdong

As regards the future , both Hong Kong and Gu angdong face a similar set of questions
How to re-invest the “ windfall profits" eamed in the past decade in a way that can benefit the most
the future development of the economy? How to convert short-term and static advantages into
long-tenn and dynamic advantages? During the process of change, how to contain or alleviate
problems and negative side-effects that have arisen from structural imbalances?
There are two mostly likely 臼ture tr句 ectories for the Hong Kong economy: (1) Continue
the “ de-industrialization" process, without caring about the phenomenon of "hollowing 0叭" and
allocate more resources in the development of the financial and sef\吐ce sectors. In this way, Hong
Kong will develop into a world-class financial centre similar to New York and London. We have
coined the tenn "Manhattanization" for Üús process. 13 (2) Follow a development strategy that
emphasizes both financial services and manufacturìng industries with higher value-added and
technologica1 content This requires the investment of the short-tenn profits rrom the China
bonanza into the manufàcturing sector to upgrade technologies and to develop new industries
Singapore and , to a less extent, Shanghai and Greater Tok:y o, are successful examples of
12See Han Houyuan et al 、 "Guangdong chanye jiegou tiaozheng yu jinrong tizhi gaige" (p roduction
Structural Adjustment and Financial System Reform in Guangdong) , Glωtωαn
棺
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g
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吋)， No. 1, 1991 , 仰
P p . 8-10
叭~ and Ts翎
an
咚
1嗨
g Sh
加
u必，
Y.M . Yeωun咚
1港
g and 伽
D 趴a盯訓
泊
，九Y
咐
v
f而id K.Y. Chu (廿
eds吋)， ωα
仰
n~
μ
do
仰
ng
ι: 品
SIur
川
ν句吵J of
歹/ α Province 仰
un~拾跆r
咚
go
仿in
增'g Rapid
Chαnge， The Chinese University Press, 1994, pp . 159咀 173
13See for example Tsang Shu必， The Economy" , in Donald McMillan and Man Si-wai (eds.) , 1he
Other llong Kong Report 1994, The Chinese University Press, 1994, pp.125-148.
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metropolises with industries. Obviously, the current trend in Hong Kong is to go along where
"quick money" can be earned, i.e. down the first road of “ Manhattanization". To switch to the
second tr句的tory， a good deal of efforts, buttressed by long-terrn vision and courage, on the p訂t of
the private sector as well as the government, is needed , which lamentably may be lacking around
the 1997 political transition
Down the path of Manhattanization, the problems that we discussed in section IV above,
de-industri a1 ization, lack of technological progress, int1 ation , worsening inequality etc., would tend
to aggravate in Hong Kong 孔10reover，的 the Chinesc economy st剖ts to take 0宜: Hong Kong
may have to undergo further "structural transformation" to keep ahead of other competing cities
and regions in China, in particular Shanghai. ln the end , the territory could be forced into a peculiar
mode of specialization, under which only actìvities of "high-risk, high-returns" find it viable to be
based here. The trouble is that a limited proportion of the local population can engage profitably in
these activities. Structural unemployment may replace labour shortage as a headache. Ironical妙，
Hong Kong will then be even more "Manhattanized" under such a scenario, as de-industrialization
becomes total, financial wizardry dorninates, and the ugly reality of poverty in the midst of affiuence
surfaces. The social consequences could be daunting. 14
Some would argue that even total de-industrialization of Hong Kong is notrung to worry
about. Why is it necessary for Hong Kong to have any manufacturing industries at all, while New
York does not have such industri郎， nor does London or Paris? The answer is simple: because
Hong Kong , unlike these metropolises in relation to their home count旬， is supposed to be a
separate economic system 企om the Chinese one under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
Aft er 1997, Hong Kong will continue to issue an independent curren句， keep its fiscal autonomy,
and determine its own migration policy. So in theory the Hong Kong economy cannot be 戶lly
integrated with the Chinese counterpart because there will not be totally 企ee flows of monetary,
fiscal and human resources across the border The Hong Kong economy must maintain her own
coherence
Hong Kong residents cannot migrate to Guangdong in the same way as US citizens move
from New Y ork to California. Hence, any local structural unemployment cannot be easily solved
by an expedient transfer of human resources to the north. In the case of a fiscal or a balance-ofpayments 仰的， Beijing is not supposed to come to our rescue, at least not direct1y. We also have
to look after our own inflation and distribution problems. I11 a nutshell , 110ng Kong is a very
special case of regional economics.
As a service economy, Hong Kong faces possible contraction in the internal and external
demands for its services. Due to the rise of a number of service centres jn China, including
Shanghai, Gu angzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai etc. , Hong kong is under some pressure, particularly as it
has been criticized as being too expensive by Chinese sources (see below). However, and this
14 An

earlier warning of this scenario was ftred by one of the authors. See Tsang Shu-ki, "The
Economy" , in 刃le ()ther lfong Kong Report 1994, ibid 1994 was still a year when labour
shortage was a problem. However, the situation changed drastically and in the second ha1f of 1995 ,
Hong Kong saw a 10-year high in its unemployment rate at 3.60/0 . Behind the problem were both
cyclical and long-run factors
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brings us back to Manhattanization again, Hong Kong in the u1timate analysis still has an edge over
these competing cities because of its systemic advantage as a capitalist economy (guaranteed for 50
years) vis-a-vis the "socialist market economy" of Shanghai and the like. There must be some
financial and related activities which would be regarded as outright "speculative" or "nonproductive" by China, which the latter would not want to engage in and for which Hong Kong
would exce1. In this sense, socialist China would still have to depend on capitalist Hong Kong. We
can already observe that Hong Kong is taking a lead in the so called "derivatives revolution" in
finance over China. This reinforces our argument that the territory may in the end be shifting into a
peculiar mode of specialization that focuses on activities of a very "high-risk, high-returns" nature,
under which structural employment could emerge as a problem

As to internal demand for services, Hong Kong down the road of Manhattanization is likely
to be constrained by the trend of widening income inequ a1 ity (see Table 5 above). It is well
established in Marxian as wel1 as Keynesian economics that an expanding income gap would harm
average consumption as the rich show a much lower marginal propensity to consume than the
poor. A concentration of money in the former's hands inevitably results in weak sales of norma1
goods; and in the extreme, leads to an "underconsumption crisis". As a small open economy, Hong
Kong still would not be exempted from such a crisis, as domestic demands for non-tradables (包od，
housing, transportation etc.) are key pillars of the economy. Weak retail s祉es in Hong Kong for
the past few years have alerted many to such a possibility, a1though again both cyclical and long-run
factors have been at work.的
Hong Kong probably could learn more from the experience of city economies that aspire to
maintain a balance between industry and service, such as Singapore and Shanghai. Singapore has
even set a lower limit for the share of manufacturing in GDP at 25% (Hong Kong 祉ready we叫
down to 8.8% in 1995 , as Table 1 shows); and Shanghai has unveiled ambitious plans to develop
b ec
∞
omi
旭
1誼ing the
high-tech industries on its outskirts. So perhaps instead of 忱
China, Hong Kong should servG as its 心 ingapore" or "Shanghai". A possible mode of operation
for Hong Kong's industries is the combination of China's capabilities in technological R & D with
the territory's expertise in design, packaging, and commercialization. Genuine efforts need to be
made to c1imb the technological ladder and to maintain a viable industri a1 base, which will bring
long-run benefits. It is foolhardy to abandon short-run comparative advantage. Trading and
service sectors should no doubt be further promoted, but not one-sidedly. In any case, a balanced
strategy like this can only be implemented through conscious effort by the authorities with regard to
macroeconornic and microeconomic polici郎， as well as cooperation by the Chinese enterprises and
the loc a1 private sector

In the recent past, the Hong Kong government seems to have become aware of the pitfalls
of complete de-industrialization and letting short-termism prevai1. It has put some money into
providing matching grants for private sector R & D; establishing technology centres, and most
notably, embarking on the construction of a 字cience parl<". Without much fanfare , these moves
represent a shift fonn the hands-off attitude of the past (which was often pronounced, but not

15See Tsang Shu-ki, '.~ Xianggangjingji wang hechu qu?" (Wither the Hong Kong Economy?) , Ming
PaoDai秒， Hong Kong , 15 November 1995 .
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strict1y followed anyway). Wh ether these moves will have any significant effect on the
development of the Hong Kong economy, we èan only wait and see.
As far as Guangdong is concemed, Manhattenization was not and never will be an option
With a population of about 70 million, more than 10 times the size of Hong Kong, Guangdong
cannot sweep aside manufacturing industries, or even agriculture (lest huge imports，企om other
provinces or outside the country, will drain provincial resources heavily). On the other hand,
services have no doubt been underdeveloped in Guangdong, in a relative sense at least, because of
the traditional socialist bias and the rapid rise in living standards that raises demands. Overal1,
Guangdong has to maintain a more balanced economic structure among the primary, secondary,
and tertiary sectors, compared with Hong Kong

ln 1978 , the ratio among the three sectors in Guangdong was 29.9 : 46 .4 : 23 . 7~ then it
changed to 17.3 : 50 .4 : 32.3 in 1993. 16 The surge ofmanufacturing industries in the province has
been remarkable, but these industries þ'ave been troubled by two key problems: (1) Their
technologicallevel was not high; and (21 There was an acute imbalance in sectoral structure, with
the raw material and energy sub-sectors lagging seriously behind, thus constraining the
lmprover削 in overall efficiency

!

Even under the one-sided outward orientation of the Guangdong economy in the past,
some notable difficulties already emerged. One classic example is the province's foreign exchange
imbalance in 1993. On the basis of customs statistics, Guangdong's exports in the year totalled
US$27.03 billion while imports amounted to US$19.90 billion, hence producing a trade surplus of
US$7 . 日 billion. However, according to an article on Guangdongjinro.楞， actual foreign exchange
receipt from exports tumed out to be oIÙy US$7 billion whereas the ac仙al usage of foreign
exchange for imports was US$10.4 billion. So a deflcit ofUS$3 .4 billion resulted, and "had to be
solved by going through the swap centres". 17 The deviation of the trade-related foreign exchange
balance from the recorded trade balance is well known in China because of various forms of
leakages and statistical discrepancies. 18 Nevertheless, the very low receipt rate 企om expo討s (oIÙy
26%) , compared with the import utilization rate of 52%, was striking even by Chinese standards.
( The low receipt of 必
fb址伽忱
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Guangdo
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ng economy as a large number of 必
for昀
elψgt
伊
n叫
-invested enterprises uses the province as an
outward processing zone, with the resu1t that the ratio of value-added accrued to Guangdong
remaîns small. ) Imports of agricult叫 produces， raw and semi-processed materials and 0伽

16Calculated in current prices from figures in Guangdong tongji nianjian 1994 (Guangdong
Statistical Yearbook 1994)
17L i Dan-er, "Jius
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Guangdong jingrong (Guangdong Fînance),

18See, for example, Tsang Sh小姐， "Towards Full Convertibility? China's Foreign Exchange
Reforms" , China Information , Vol.眩， no.1 , 1994, pp.1-4 1.
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industrial products, on the other hand , continue to drain valuable financial resources 企om the
provmce
The cold reality is that Guangdong faces di:ffi culties even in b a1ancing its foreign exchange
under the operational mode of"shop at the 企0肘， factory at the back". Therefo間， Gu angdong must
apparent1y do two things: (1) enhance the value-added of its production; and (2) develop a more
balanced industrial structure with a higher degree of intemaI linkage and coordination
The Guangdong authorities appear to have been aware of these problems. With a series of
policy statements and measures announced in the past few years, the province has acωally
embarked on a course of economic upgrading , that is in marked contrast with the "liberal" , "noninterventionist" stance of the Hong Kong govemment. An industri aI policy has emerged in the
province, under which strategic industries including petro-chemical, automobile, electronics,
metallurgy , constructÏ on material , textiles and drugs are targetted for promotion. On the other
hand , a p]an for regional division of labour with the province has a1 so been nurtured , with the
westem region specializing in faw material , energy and heavy industries and the eastem region
focussing on light and consumer goods indust.ries. The centre, in particular Guangzhou , would
spearhead the effort to develop services.19
This newly emerging economic strategy is encouraging, but its concrete implementation
would certainly require more than just 0伍cial pronouncements. Wh at is needed is a more rational
structuring of both industrial and locational pattems within the pro札nce， with a view to promote
intemal linkage, division of labour and cooperation as well as technological upgrading. Moreover,
structural duplication and wastage of resources must be minimized, especially with regard to
infrastructural developments , a hot issue in the 1990s

、llll.

The future mode of economic Ii nk.a ge ofHong Kong and Guangdong

Obviously~

the economic linkage between H9ng Kong 如d Guangdong should be upgraded \
in the future. Instead of continuing the oldmode of("the shop at the 合0肘， the factory 的 the back" \
operating at a more or less stagnant teclu1010gicalle~] of "the shop" , a new mode of mu1ti-sphere ../
and mu1ti-dirnensional interfaces and cooperation is needed. Greater effort should be spent on
creating long-term competitive advantage
No matter what development paths lIong Kong and Gu angdong will follow and no matter
what changes in the economic structure will take place in the two places, improvement in
m企astructure will be a cIUcial factor detennining the rate of growth. 1n the 1980s, Guangdong to a
very large extent had made use ofIlong Kong's intrastructural facilities to conduct extemal trade ,
的 shown in Table 3 above. 1nto the 1990s, like other provinces , Guangdong has emphasized the
The major policy documents are compiled in Wang Dingchang (ed.) , Er ling yí ling nían dí
Guangdong: guíhua ji zhanlu. e ya旬的 (Guangdong in 2010 : Planning and Strategic Studies) ,
Guangdong People's Publishing flouse , 1994
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construction of infrastructure so as to relieve the bottleneck sectors and to sustain high economic
growth. On the other hand , if Hong Kong is to develop further , infrastructural facilities have also
to be strengthened. One problem that has emerged is that in order to be cost effective and e伍cient，
m企astructural constructions in Hong Kong and Gu angdong, in c1 uding airports , ports, h:ighways,
railways , energy and environmental protection projects, should be coordinated
Owing to the lack of vision on the part of Hong Kong government and Sino-British
conflicts over 1997, the construction of some important infrastIuctural facilities (particularly the
newalrpo此， additional container terminals and related transpo抗 systems) has been delayed in Hong
Kong. Hence, Hong Kong is in the danger offailing to satisfy the fast-growing demand from China
in general, and 企om Guangdong in particular. Seen from this angle, Guangdong should no doubt
expand its own capacities in airports , ports, railways and even water transpo此， so as to reduce its
reliance on Hong Kong.
Another factor is of course the surging charges of re-exports and voyage services in Hong
Kong. According to an analysis of China' s General Customs, total profits earned by Hong Kong
businesses (inc1uding Chinese and foreign companies registered in Hong Kong) 企om servmg reexports to and 仕om China rose 企om US$5 .4 bi11ion in 1980 to US$14.5 billion in 1993 . The
average gross profit margin thus rose 企om 21 % to 31 %>?O Other studies also point to some
worrying statistics. For example, the handling fee for one container ranges from HK$1200 to
HK$1800 , which is 5 to 7 times that of the normal fee in Mainland China, one-third to one half
higher than that charged by Singapore, and double that of Kaohsung in Taiwan?l The underlying
cause is not just the imbalance between supply and demand, but also the existence of market power
among the small number of operators in Hong Kong. Even if Hong Kong speeds up the
construction of infrastructural facilities in the future , re-exporting charges are unlikely to fall , unless
China and other places can generate e能ctive cOlnpetition.

To this , there could be two entirely different kinds of response. The first one is an
insensitivity to the situation. The traditional mode of planning and construction of transportation
system in the 1980s could still be followed - with major routes all pointing 企om north to south,
converging to Hong Kong. The underlying assumption is that Hong Kong should still be the major
po此 for Chinese imports and exports in the future.
An other k:ind of response is( a large scale of "diversion" of the congested transportation
system in Guangdong) In the euphona after the "Deng whirlwind" of 1992, various localities have
been striving to build their own airports , railways , po討s， highways , voyage and communication
facilities , often with minimal coordination among themselves. Taking airports as an example, as
pointed out by Professor Zheng Tianxiang of Zhongshan University, the new airports in Hong
Kong, Gu angzhou , and Shenzhen all have an ultimate annual capacity of 80 million person-times,
while the airports of Zhuhai and Macau have a designed annual capacity of 1.2 million and 8 million

20Reported by Shαnghai jingji bαo (Shanghai Economic News) , 24 June 1994, p.1
21 Zheng Tianxiang, "Yue- Gang jichu sheshi jianshe 泊的ao guanjian" (My Views on the
Coordination of In企astructural Construction between Guangdong and Hong Kong) , Gang-Ao
jingji yuebao (Hong Kong Macao Economic Month1y) , October 1994.
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respeçtively. Besides, there is the extension or establishment of airports in Foshan, We也hou，
Xi axing and Jiangmen. Therefo悶， eventually, nine airports will thrive in the Pearl River Delta, with
a total annual capacity of 280 mi 1lion person-times, which will be about 9 times of the projected
population in the region. ln contrast, the Kai Tak International Airp ort of Hong Kong had a tot a1
capacity equivalent to only 4 times of the population in the territOry in 1993 . Whether there is
sufficient demand to support all the nine airports in the fu仙re is a big question.22
Obviously, both types of responses are inappropriate. To be cost-effective, there should be
coordination in the construction of infrastructural facilities between Hong Kong and Guangdong
and within Gu angdong itsel f, so as to avoid duplication and waste on the one hand , and to make
use ofeconomies of scale and to enhance efficiency on the other.
As for the issue of technological upgrading in industries, cooperation between Hong Kong
and Gu angdong will probably not be at a very high level. As discussed above, the choices facing
Hong Kong are either (1) “Ma他attanization" or (2) the “ combination of financial services and high
value-added manufacturing industries". The technological upgrading of Guangdong will, in theory,
induce Hong Kong to follow the second path. However, as discussed above, the industries that
Guangdong is planning to develop in c1 ude petrol-chemical, automobile, electronics, metallurgical,
construction material, textiles , and pharmaceutical industries etc. Among them, Hong Kong has
some advantage only in electronics, textiles and perhaps construction material. Hong Kong' s
industrialization was traditionally based on light industries. Thus , to promote the industries it has
targetted, Guangdong should go beyond just cooperation with Hong Kong. Closer ties to
European and other East Asian countries, which have comparative advantage in these fields , should
be developed. What Hong Kong can help is probably just to provide capital, infonnation and some
connectlons

At the end of 1994, an official of Guangdong's Commission for Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade was cited by a Hong Kong newspaper as saying,“Guangdong will coordinate
its economic development with the industrial transformation of Hong Kong. Development centres
for high technologies will be established together. Through Hong Kong, findings of foreign
research on high technologies will be absorbed and extension to product development and sa1 es will
be made. Production and industrial structures will be adjusted in an optimal way."23 To us , this
viewpoint is too optimistic and the description of the economic relationship between Hong Kong
and Guangdong too idealistic. The contribution of Hong Kong to Guangdong' s development of
high-technology industries should not be over-estirnated. Hong Kong does not have notable
advantage in this aspect. The development , transfer and absorption of high-technology industries
are usually effective only through ac心al investment and production. Will it not be more effective
and efficient for Gu angdong to absorb foreign technology by dealing with foreign p訂tners directly
than through the intermediation ofHong Kong?
As regards financial servÎces and other tertiary industries, the cooperation between the two
places is rather complicated. Hong Kong, as a "first-mover" , should be able to contribute more to

22 See Zheng Tianxiang, "Yue-Gang jichu sheshi jianshe 泊etiao gu叫 ian" ， ibid
23 Hong

Kong United Dai令， 19 November 1994, p.21

----,
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Gu angdong than the development of high technology industries. This is particularly true in
financing. Gu angdong can raise funds by issuing bonds and stocks in Hong Kong's financi a1
markets. Hong Kong' s expertise in this area can also facilitate the development of financi a1 and
other services in the province. Yet, there will still be a high degree of competition. As far as highlevel financi a1 services are concemed, China has already got Shanghai which will soon be at par
with Hong Kong. The roles of financi a1 services among Guan評hou， Shenzhen, and Zhuh缸， which
all aspire to be "intemationa1 financi a1 centres" , should be planned and coordinated. It will be
stretching credibility too far to advocate that southem China can host four "intemationa1 financial
centres" in the true sense.

Competition between Hong Kong and Guangdong also exists in trade-related services.
When Guangdong has expanded its capacity in airports, ports and other transportation facilities ,
accumulated su伍cient human resources and experiences, its reliance on Hong Kong will be

reduced. Part of Hong Kong' s re-exporting business will be “ diverted" to other places in
Guangdong. The problems of congestion and "over-charging" in Hong Kong will on1y reinforce
the trend
N evertheless, Hong Kong and Guangdong are not playing a “ zero-sum game" . Under
virtuous competition, it may become a "variable-sum game" and a “ win-win" outcome is possible.
Taking trading as an example, there has already been the suggestion that Hong Kong and
Guangdong should cooperate in building an e伍cient transportation network, which can be
extended to other provinces in middle China. 1n this way, some of the foreign trade businesses in
the middle regions of the Yangzi River can be channelled southward to the Pearl River Delta,
bene且tting Guangdong as well as Hong Kong.

IX.

Concluding remarks

In the ultimate analysis, the development a1 path of either Hong Kong or Guangdong is not
entirely determined by the mode of economic linkage between the two economies. In Hong Kong,
questions such as whether Manhattanization is the choice or whether a more balanced production
structure should be nurtured are hard ones that must be answered by local entrepreneurs and the
government , a1though as we analyzed above, it is not easy to transcend beyond the temptations of
easy money and short-term profits that have arisen from the opening of China and the regio叫 re
allocation of resources. As to Gu angdong , a much larger entity with even more complicated
factors affecting economic development , the pursuance of a balanced strategy and regional
coordination is a very difficu1t art. Hong Kong's assistance in this aspect can only be 幽泊ted.

As to the negative side-effects and problems of the bonanza of the past fifteen years, such
as inf1 ation , regional and income disparity, "hollowing out" etc., Hong Kong and Guangdong will
have to deal with them independently through suitable policies and remedial measures.
These conclusions are not meant to undermine the importance of the economic linkage
between Gu angdong and Hong Kong. The short-term benefits that it has brought about have been
tremendous to both sides, and we have analyzed them in some details in this paper. Our message is
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indeed simple: while the mutu a11y beneficial mechanisrns should be maintained and improved, there
is a strong need to develop Jong-term competitiveness and dynamic advantage, a task which is
likely to ca11 for more independent efforts on the pa討 of Hong Kong and Gu angdong than in the
past decade. Hence, a certain distancing in economic relationship is hea1thy
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